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(Item 121)

Despatched: 18 November 1941. P.M. WASHINGTON

Received: 19 November 1941. P.M. Foreign Ministry

Strictly Confidential -- Ambassador's Code

From: Ambassador NOMURA

To: Foreign Minister TOGO

#1133

KURUSU states:

(1)-----According to the views held by Ambassador NOMURA and myself, although the President maintains calm attitude outwardly, we feel that the President possesses keen desire to conclude the U.S.-Japanese negotiation. Now, that just because the other party does not take in whole-heartedly our proposal there is no reason for an immediate conjecture that it is a willingly-delayed policy. Moreover it is most important at this time not to resort to actions that could not be amended afterwards.

(2)-----Through the establishment of the Revised Neutrality Law, etc., the U.S. interests were all the more focused to the Atlantic, and therefore, although they are affirming preparations and determination to fight Japan if compelled to, it seems that they are seeking if possible to maintain security in their back front by negotiating with our country. In both of our interviews, with the President on the 17th and with HULL on the 18th, much emphasis was placed on the question of the Tri-Partite treaty. The reason for their giving more force to their assertion than is usual could be attributed chiefly to the consideration given therein. That is, as an assumption to U.S.-Japanese compromise, the U.S. Government shall give the American public in general, the impression of Japanese-German estrangement. To do this, it is desired that utilization be made regarding U.S.-Japanese joint declaration concerning non-discrimination in trade, or to let Japan participate in the agreement regarding the same question now being negotiated between the U.S. and Britain, or to utilize messages manifesting peaceful aims on the part of JAPAN as suggested by the Secretary of State HULL in our interview of the 18th.

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(3)-----An acute change in the present state of Japanese-German relations is, of course, an impossibility, and in view of the aforementioned conditions, I believe it is most important for our country to give the United States sufficient security possible so that they could all the more concentrate deeply to the Atlantic, thereby enabling us to occupy favourable positions in the international situation that is to arrive after the war, not mentioning our full scale execution of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities. (Part 2) In regard to the question of whether the U.S. and Britain will, or will not turn the point of their swords to us after the present war and start suppressing us, I stated this at the conference on the 17th pointing out the bitter experience our country underwent during after the last World War (I) and bluntly explained the suspicion embraced by a group of our people toward the Anglo-Americans. To this, the President unhesitantly replied that the new agreement also covers such points. (Cover it all).

(4)-----In view of the present state of affairs in our country's internal situation, I believe there are various difficulties to be met before being able to attain some measures along the lines desired by the United States. For the time being, as a link to fill the lapse in time, it is most desirous that a time limit be set in regard to American-Japanese negotiation and to pave a way through this confronting situation, I think that it is necessary to ask for an assurance to import a set quantity of petroleum and also the rescinding of freezing orders. In my interview of the 18th, I together with Ambassador NOMURA suggested a return to the condition prior to 24 July. As an equivalent to this, I think that the U.S. might not consent with only our B proposal stipulating the non-advancement of our armed forces outside French Indo-China, and our testimony given vague in condition regarding evacuation of troops from French Indo-China, as evidenced by our past negotiation. I suggest that at this time, you will show in advance, some degree of sincerity such as to commence evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China.

Now, as there is the question of your instructed time limit, I would like, if possible, to effect immediate disposal of the matter while the President is still in Washington, which I am urgently advising.

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大臣 次官
垂采御書

卷之三

貞和六年夏月十八日新後 墓碑

壬午九月齋後奉省著

長竹館 楊柳齋

東坡外傳卷之三

野村大傳

第一二三課

卷之三

(一)野村木業及本坡人觀測二依之大約與於春面將之不能應付
之北洋日本之交涉員亦公認實意有二認於此之原因當有
其在而其不滿欲以二十日被以平定之還送至奉天之斷然道
之於半紀前之時即為中國之最也。此舉又前

(二)中華人民共和國對外條約本國，開心以一層金漆，向其本國
子曰「但得人之才作樂之聲者也」，準備者禮之聲者，
此固亦不得以教也。又漢之樂者後，心得人之才，下也。
如是之日，會與之於中大饋，十八日，凡長官之使，凡三司
屬國之使，皆聽之於中大饋，口其，並聽之，人君之使，
則以中大饋之使，思聽之，此中大饋，即中大饋之使，
曰中大饋，而此之謂中大饋，謂少日獨特，其家之樂，
方度，以過而世，則主樂，因之曰中大饋，宣音，曰中大饋，
三奏樂，中大饋，而謂之樂，中大饋，謂之樂，中大饋，又人之命，曰中大饋，
而人之命，不設也，然中大饋，其事，中大饋，其事，中大饋，

(三) 口傳與書寫：口傳文化在傳統社會中扮演重要角色，但隨著書面文字的普及，書寫文化逐漸成為主流。書寫文化強調規範性和標準性，對知識傳授、記憶保存和傳播具有重要意義。

戰後東京方面軍事會議有經過向日本軍事部報告，
之十八、十七日會議，日本總理前田會津於此時亦在軍事會議會場，
據我軍部對斯諾的會見筆直說明此討伐大將軍（吉平）
協定斯比某人毛金部包含八千十日（cover it all）上各

（四）今

鐵道內情雖有現狀三鐵三合豐米側，奉天，滿洲之同
等皆猶重復化之種々困難了也。上寒考不附其當出其
同，該系十二月斯比日來交涉為止付「日本人民」以
「張本希望」之考入產當局圖打開為謀除除，尼地
一軍運輸入，保障不求此難了也。上寒考十八日會議於了
野村大臣上令至日于雷以前，能復歸工示唆。又此次
第十次米側上之方對價付乙宋，傳自今即實支那以
外或力不從，其條件參見本付印，徵集！註言！二十六條
本來滿洲過鹽之考不存服也。十二科此際豫大
南部付印徵集，開始值，該在考付上之清苦也。又
何處遇合，「日本人民」上元之參得之，會通大統領
在考中之處處理，進度年付右至急邊，言不（）

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Page 1

Item 134

To: Ambassador NOMURA in America

From: Foreign Minister TOGO

Despatch No. 43905

Depatched: ²⁰ November 1941 - 0030 *Drafted: 19, Nov., 1941.*

Telegram No. 800 (Ambassador Code) Very Urgent.

Re my Telegram No. 799

Re paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 780. Southeast Asia and South Pacific includes Dutch Indies and Thailand, but not China.

Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is desirable that the required quantity be decided upon by agreement of both governments before the signatures are affixed to this present agreement.

Re paragraph 4, please bear in mind that it means the cessation of aid to Chiang by the United States.

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784.

Re paragraph 7, latter part of item 2. As an explanation of our attitude as expressed in "Japan would decide entirely independently" in case the U.S. should enter the European War, you may point out that the Empire can decide independently as to whether or not there had been an attack, without being bound to the interpretations of the other countries involved in the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Tripartite Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).

Ex. #1180

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Jan 134

郵便課長 主理郵政處事務 閣第15年三月四日批	郵便課長 主理郵政處事務 閣第15年三月四日批
東北 野村大使 平治 重造第43905号 平治 年16年1月8日30分	東北 野村大使 平治 年16年1月8日30分
平治 八〇〇四 (急函特印大圖附)	平治 八〇〇四 (急函特印大圖附)

VERY URGENT

往寧波十八九月

往寧波十八九月

十二月二十日到寧波之南太平洋上日本國領事館
及日本領事館

十二月二十日到寧波之南太平洋上日本國領事館

十二月二十日到寧波之南太平洋上日本國領事館

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